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Margaret Cavendish presented and defended a distinctive materialist approach in her 
publications of the 1650s and 1660s. Even among materialists, Cavendish’s views stand out, 
especially if one is inclined to think of early modern philosophy in terms of mechanism’s 
replacement of Aristotelianism.1 If that’s the way one thinks about it, then something like 
Hobbes’s materialism will be one’s paradigm case.2 Cavendish however, despite being a 
thoroughgoing materialist about the natural world, avoided, and indeed reversed, Hobbes’s 
explanation of the mental in terms of the mechanical. For Cavendish, matter is 
fundamentally and irreducibly thinking. 
Cavendish developed these views in two groups of books on natural philosophy. The 
first is a series of related works in which Cavendish focuses on presenting her own views.3 
The second group is a pair of books from the mid 1660s – the 1664 Philosophical Letters and 
the 1666 Observations upon Experimental Philosophy – in which Cavendish engaged directly and 
critically with the views of other philosophers.4 I focus here on Cavendish’s Philosophical 
                                                
1 Thus, for example, Garber and Ayers single out mechanism’s replacement of 
Aristotelianism as a central theme of their Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy: 
“in the seventeenth century one competitor came to rival and, eventually, to eclipse the 
philosophy of the schools: the mechanistic, or ‘corpuscularian’, philosophy, a descendant of 
ancient atomism and the ancestor of present-day physics. A main theme of the present 
volumes is the emergence and establishment of the different versions of this ‘new 
philosophy’” (Garber and Ayers 1998, 3). 
2 There are certainly interesting relationships between Cavendish’s view and Hobbes’s. See 
Detlefsen (2006, 212-6), Detlefsen (2007, 181-3), Hutton (1997), Sarasohn (2010, 85-93), and 
Duncan (2012). 
3 These are the Philosophical Fancies, two editions of the Philosophical and Physical Opinions, and 
the Grounds of Natural Philosophy. 
4 The Philosophical Letters might also be paired with another 1664 volume, the Sociable Letters. 
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Letters. Here we see her explicit engagement with the early modern mechanist philosophies 
of Hobbes and Descartes. These are, indeed, the main topic of part 1 of her book.5   
Cavendish believed that the natural world was wholly material, and that nature was 
one infinite material thing (PL 1.2).6 Thus she was a sort of materialist about nature, though 
not about God, whom she called in contrast a spirit, not a body (PL 1.2). The materialism 
about nature is surprising itself, in her context, for there don’t seem to have been many 
materialists in 1660s England. But the really distinctive features of Cavendish’s materialism 
come out when one asks what that one material thing is like.7 
Most basically, Cavendish held that matter is fundamentally and irreducibly thinking. 
Details aside, the answer to how matter can think is that matter always and everywhere can 
think. So the common materialist puzzle of how one can make large thinking things out of 
small unthinking things does not arise. Of course, the related panpsychist puzzle of how 
large thinking things can be made out of small thinking things does arise, so all is not entirely 
straightforward. Still this, very generally, is the picture: materialism, with thinking 
everywhere. More specifically, Cavendish took there to be three “degrees” of matter. The 
first two of these degrees are animate: they are the rational and the sensitive matter. The 
third degree is the inanimate matter. Moreover, matter of each of the three degrees is 
thoroughly mixed together, so that in any given piece of matter, no matter how small, one 
                                                
5 Part 2 focuses on Henry More, and part 3 on J.B. van Helmont, while part 4 considers 
various other figures. More was aware of Cavendish’s criticism. Indeed, she sent him a copy 
of the Philosophical Letters (Conway 1992, 234, 237). Hobbes presumably knew of it too. 
Though there is, I believe, no written record of this, there is one of Cavendish’s having 
earlier sent him a volume of her plays (Hobbes 1994a, 524). 
6 I give references to the Philosophical Letters (Cavendish 1664) using the abbreviation ‘PL’ 
followed by the part and letter numbers. 
7 Cavendish’s view is distinctive, at any rate, among those usually identified as philosophers. 
But see Fallon (1991, 79-100) on Milton’s “animist materialism”, and Hill (1991, 142) saying 
of Winstanley that his “philosophy which started with a vision seems to have ended in a kind 
of materialist pantheism” (142). 
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will find matter of each of the three degrees.8 Thus although in a sense there are places 
where there is no thinking stuff – those are just the places where the inanimate matter is – 
there’s also a sense in which there is thinking stuff everywhere. 
We might thus say that Cavendish believed in a version of materialism in which there 
are minds everywhere. A view on which there are minds everywhere might well seem a 
curious oddity at best, for despite some historical and recent interest, panpsychism remains 
very much a minority position.9 However, Cavendish’s belief that there are many more 
minds in the world than one might ordinarily suspect was part of a significant trend in 
seventeenth-century philosophy. Several prominent philosophers responded to early modern 
mechanists – to Hobbes in particular, but also to Descartes – by postulating minds 
everywhere, or at least in many surprising places in the world.  
Hobbes aimed to explain the natural world using a minimal ontology of matter in 
motion. Consider some of the critics of that approach: Cudworth, More, Leibniz, and 
Cavendish. Their views differ, but they agree that Hobbes’s minimal materialist ontology is 
not enough to explain the workings of the natural world.10 They also all respond to that 
situation in the same way: they supplement Hobbes’s minimal ontology with a belief that 
there are many more minds in the world than one might ordinarily think. Their views about 
those additional minds differ significantly: Cudworth’s plastic natures, More’s spirit of 
                                                
8 See for example PL 1.30 (“there is no Part that has not a comixture”) and PL 1.35 (“there 
being a thorow mixture of animate, rational and sensitive, and inanimate matter”). 
9 For recent discussions, see for example Freeman (2006). For an overview of seventeenth-
century panpsychist views, see Skrbina (2005, 65-100). 
10 The point is differently expressed. Cudworth and More focus on the inadequacy of 
mechanical material explanations of various natural phenomena, and more generally of the 
regular workings of the material world. See for example Cudworth’s argument for plastic 
natures (Cudworth 1651, 146-74) and More’s for a spirit of nature (More 1659, 449-70). 
Leibniz argues that one needs to involve active force in one’s explanations. Leibniz’s 
arguments apply to Hobbes (Duncan 2010, 13) but were more often directed at Cartesians, 
as in sections 17-8 of the “Discourse on Metaphysics” (Leibniz 1989, 49-52). 
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nature; Cavendish’s animate matter; and all the complications of Leibnizian ontology. But 
these views all fill the same role, of adding in minds, which think in some sort of irreducible 
way, to supplement the allegedly inadequate ontology of inanimate matter in motion.  
Cavendish was thus far from alone in thinking, in response to Hobbes, that there are 
minds everywhere. Moreover, this was not just a response to Hobbes. It was also a response 
to Descartes’s version of mechanism. For though Descartes, unlike Hobbes, believed that 
human beings had immaterial souls, these did not fill the role that plastic natures are the like 
were intended to fill. His mechanical explanations of natural phenomena were thought to 
have similar gaps to Hobbes’s. For example, More’s arguments for a spirit of nature target 
“that admirable Master of Mechanicks Des-Cartes” (More 1659, Preface, section 11) as well as 
Hobbes. And Cavendish – like More and Cudworth and Leibniz – was responding as much 
to Descartes as to Hobbes, as is clear from part 1 of the Philosophical Letters. 
There is, to be sure, something curious about a philosopher taking this sort of line 
while also remaining a materialist. That oddity is only partially reduced by noticing the ways 
in which More, for example, was sometimes suggested to be closer to materialism than he 
would like to admit.11 But perhaps the felt oddity results, in large part, from an implicit 
attachment to the notion that materialists – at least early modern ones – should be some sort 
of mechanists. It is just that notion that Cavendish’s view challenges. While Hobbes’s 
materialism was in a way the apotheosis of mechanism, Cavendish showed how one might 
retain the materialism while rejecting the mechanical project. 
 Sections 1 and 2 below fill out the picture of Cavendish’s anti-mechanical 
materialism, by looking at what she has to say about the individual souls of finite beings, and 
the soul of nature. The third section then digresses briefly to examine Cavendish’s apparent 
                                                
11 See Henry (1986). 
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deviation from materialism in her views about supernatural, immaterial souls. Section 4 then 
returns to the anti-mechanist materialism, and argues that at its core is a disagreement with 
the mechanist over what is to be the basic causal model in terms of which all other natural 
change is to be explained. Where the mechanist’s basic models involve impact and the 
workings of clockwork, Cavendish turns things on their head, and takes the individual 
human being, their thoughts and decisions, as the basic model. 
 
1. The natural souls of finite individuals 
Cavendish does seem to think there are such things as the minds of individuals, such as the 
minds of individual human beings. That is, she believes there is such a thing as “natural mind 
and soul” (PL 1.35). That’s despite an occasional tendency to saying there is just one thing, 
nature, and therefore no individual humans or minds of such.12 And also despite the puzzle 
about panpsychist materialism, of how one can construct big thinking things out of little 
thinking things. 
Cavendish thinks, indeed, that that there are minds of many things, not just humans. 
Thus there are minds of animals, minds of rocks, indeed minds and knowledge of artifacts. 
“Sense and Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and Animals” (PL 1.11). Indeed, 
even artifacts have knowledge, according to Cavendish: 
though the Bell hath not an animal knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and 
knowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a vegetable knowledg; for the shape 
and form of the Bell, Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial; nevertheless each in its 
                                                
12 See Detlefsen (2006, 227-40). 
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own kind may have as much knowledg as an animal in his kind; onely they are 
different according to the different proprieties of their Figures (PL 2.13).13 
Focusing on humans, however, Cavendish thinks that each human being in the 
natural world has a natural, rational soul. It also has sensitive matter, and thus sensitive 
perception, but only, it would seem, one soul. That is, there are in each of us two sorts of 
perception: “it is not onely the Mind that perceives in the kernel of the Brain, but that there 
is a double perception, rational and sensitive, and that the mind perceives by the rational, but 
the body and the sensitive organs by the sensitive perception” (PL 1.37). However there is in 
each of us only one (natural) soul, the rational one: “natural mind or soul is of one kind … 
being made of rational matter” (PL 1.14). There is not a sensitive soul, at least not in name. 
There is a rational one. It looks like we can pick it out just as being the rational matter within 
the human being.14 
I do not here pursue the issue of how Cavendish thinks we ought to individuate 
human beings. In the Philosophical Letters, she does say that the cause of the distinctions 
between finite creatures is motion.15 She seems however to have little or nothing to say 
about the criteria of individuation.16 That might seem a frustrating gap. But one ought to 
remember that Cavendish’s concern is very much with natural philosophy rather than 
                                                
13 Although Cavendish talks of knowledge here rather than of minds, she seems happy to 
move between talk of minds and talk of sense, reason, and knowledge. See for example PL 
1.36. 
14 Thus talk of “the Rational matter, which is the Mind” (PL 1.8); of “the mind or the 
rational matter” (PL 1.20); and of “the rational part in Man, which is the Mind or Soul” (PL 
1.35). 
15 For, “though Matter is one and the same in its Nature, and never changes, yet the motions 
are various, which motions are the several actions of one and the same Natural Matter; and 
this is the cause of so many several Creatures” (PL 2.11). 
16 For further discussion of Cavendish on individuation, with reference in particular to her 
discussion of resurrection in the second appendix of the Grounds of Natural Philosophy 
(Cavendish 1668, 257-6), see Lascano (2014). 
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metaphysics. Here her attitude seems to parallel Hobbes’s – do just as much metaphysics as 
you feel you need to do to get on with the rest of philosophy, then get on with the rest. 
Overall then, the story about souls of humans seems at this stage to be basically what 
one would expect from the overall story. The (rational, natural) soul of an individual human 
is made up of (perhaps, identified with) the rational matter in that individual human.17 These 
natural souls of humans and other finite individuals are not, however, the only souls that 
Cavendish identifies in the world. 
 
2. The soul of nature 
In addition to the souls of finite beings, Cavendish thinks there to be a soul of nature. In the 
Observations she explicitly denies that this is incorporeal: the soul of nature must be corporeal, 
as well as the body, for an incorporeal substance cannot be mixed with a corporeal 
(Cavendish 2001, 251). In the Philosophical Letters, the issue arises in arguing against More’s 
incorporeal spirit of nature. Cavendish says against More against that: 
he that thinks it absurd to say, the World is composed of meer self-moving Matter, 
may consider, that it is more absurd to believe Immaterial substances or spirits in 
Nature, as also a spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon Matter; 
For why should it not be as probable, that God did give Matter a selfmoving power 
to her self, as to have made another Creature to govern her? For Nature is not a 
Babe, or Child, to need such a Spiritual Nurse, to teach her to go, or to move; 
neither is she so young a Lady as to have need of a Governess, for surely she can 
                                                
17 An unanswered question: does any arbitrarily chosen piece of matter have a rational soul 
made up of the rational matter within it? If not, why do some have souls and some not?  A 
bell has knowledge – does it have a soul, and if so what about the top half of the bell? It is 
hard to see why Cavendish should not say ‘yes’ to such questions, though she tends to focus 
on the souls of more often recognized creatures and artifacts. 
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govern her self; she needs not a Guardian for fear she should run away with a 
younger Brother, or one that cannot make her a Jointure (PL 2.6). 
Still, despite all this, Cavendish does explicitly say that there is such a thing as a soul 
of nature. Indeed there are even hints in the text of the view that this is the one and only 
soul, though that is not usually her view, granting as she does that there are souls of finite 
individuals.  
Note first a text from a year before the Philosophical Letters: “I meddle not with the 
Particular Divine Souls of Men, but only the General Soul of Nature, which I name the 
rational Matter” (Cavendish 1663, Epistle to the Reader). I will return to the divine souls of 
men in section 3. For now, note that not only is there said to be a general soul of nature, but 
it is identified with the rational matter, presumably all the rational matter in nature, and it is 
said to be the only soul Cavendish talks about, as if it is the only natural soul there is. 
The same themes are present, if slightly less clearly, in this text from the Philosophical 
Letters itself: 
That these sensitive and rational parts of matter are the purest and subtilest parts of 
Nature, as the active parts, the knowing, understanding and prudent parts, the 
designing, architectonical and working parts, nay, the Life and Soul of Nature, and 
that there is not any Creature or part of nature without this Life and Soul; and that 
not onely Animals, but also Vegetables, Minerals and Elements, and what more is in 
Nature, are endued with this Life and Soul, Sense and Reason (PL, Preface to the 
Reader) 
Here again, there is such a thing as the soul of nature, which is a material thing, not an 
immaterial one. Again it is to be identified with some of the matter in nature, but here it is 
perhaps identified with all the animate matter, rational and sensitive, rather than just the 
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rational matter. As in the previous text though, the soul of nature is to be spread throughout 
the world. Thus one wonders how this soul of nature relates to the souls of finite individuals 
that are in – indeed, are parts of – nature. 
We might also ask how the soul of nature relates to the thoughts of the personified 
female ‘nature’ that appears at times in Cavendish’s work, as for instance in PL 1.2: “Nature 
having Infinite parts of Infinite degrees, must also have an Infinite natural wisdom to order 
her natural Infinite parts and actions, and consequently an Infinite natural power to put her 
wisdom into act; and so of the rest of her attributes, which are all natural”. I take it that the 
soul of nature is nature’s soul, so the soul of nature thinks what nature thinks. But what does 
it think? We get an example in the first letter of Cavendish’s discussion of the work of Henry 
More: 
I think there is no such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not onely amongst 
men, but also, amongst all other creatures, for if nature believes a God, all her parts, 
especially the sensitive and rational, which are the living and knowing parts, and are 
in all natural creatures, do the like, and therefore all parts and creatures in nature do 
adore and worship God, for any thing man can know to the contrary; for no 
question, but natures soule adores and worships God as well as man’s soule; and why 
may not God be worshipped by all sorts and kinds of creatures as well, as by one 
kind or sort? (PL 2.1) 
Here Cavendish appears to claim that (a) (the soul of) nature believes in God, (b) that all the 
sensitive and rational parts of nature, such as the rational matter in some individual human, 
believe in God, and (c) that (b) is true because (a) is true.18 This suggests a surprising 
principle: if a soul s1 believes p, then any smaller soul s2 that is part of s1 also believes that p. One 
                                                
18 Similar claims are made at the end of PL 2.4. 
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might try to soften that surprising claim in various ways, say by noting the hesitations in the 
above text, or by pointing to Cavendish’s discussion of difficulties associated with thinking 
of God: e.g., having an idea of God but not of his essence.19 None of this shows Cavendish 
giving up on the surprising claim though.  
Souls, in Cavendish’s view, are bodies and thus stand in a part-whole relationship. 
My rational soul is thus literally part of the soul of nature. It is thus no shock to see 
Cavendish thinking there is some important relation between these souls’ beliefs. The idea, 
perhaps, is that a belief of a soul is somehow suffused throughout it: it is not held by one 
part and not others. A soul’s possession of a belief is certainly not to be explained 
mechanically, in terms of parts. Cavendish may seem, indeed, to lack resources to deny the 
principle.20 
What about the opposite direction? Cavendish seems to have no inclination to assert 
that a soul s1 must believe something just because its smaller part s2 does. That would 
saddle the soul of nature with all the partial, indeed contradictory, beliefs of all the creatures 
of the world. But this sensible enough view does leave Cavendish holding that some parts of 
the world’s rational matter believe p while others believe not-p, and thus that beliefs can to 
some extent be located within the rational matter of the world. 
 However exactly this is to be resolved, however, the overall picture remains clear. 
Natural souls are all to be identified with matter. The soul of nature is all the rational matter 
                                                
19 “[N]aturally we may, and really have a knowledge of the existence of God … but I dare 
not think, that naturally we can have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know what God 
is in his very nature and essence; for how can there be a finite Idea of an Infinite God?” (PL 
2.2). 
20 Are there, instead, positive reasons Cavendish might have why nature’s belief in God 
cannot be located? Any suggestions here seem speculative. One might offer an argument 
from sufficient reason: there is no sufficient reason for the belief to be in one part of the 
soul of nature rather than another, so it is everywhere. Or it might alternatively just be that 
God has decreed that the belief in God will be one held by nature and all parts of nature. 
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in the world. The soul of some individual is all the rational, or perhaps all the animate, 
matter in them. Cavendish’s view may have been anti-mechanist. But her view of natural 
thinking things was thoroughly materialist. 
 
3. The divine and supernatural soul 
There is, however, a sort of deviation from materialism in Cavendish’s work. Though she 
maintained that the natural world is wholly material, she nevertheless also held that human 
beings are not wholly material. For, in the Philosophical Letters and in some other texts of the 
mid-1660s, Cavendish asserted that humans had two souls: not only the natural souls 
discussed above, but also other souls, which she called supernatural and divine. Thus, for 
example: 
And all this I understand of the Natural Soul of Man; not of the Divine Soul, and her 
powers and faculties, for I leave that to Divines to inform us of; onely this I say, that 
men not conceiving the distinction between this natural and divine Soul, make such a 
confusion betwixt those two Souls and their actions, which causes so many disputes 
and opinions (PL 2.20, 192). 
Key features of the divine soul are that it is supernatural; it is incorporeal; it is known by 
faith; it, like other incorporeal things, is inconceivable by corporeal ones; and it is said to be 
in nature but not part of nature.21 The only parts of nature are corporeal parts, and this soul 
can’t be one of those, because it is incorporeal. It has, nevertheless, has some special relation 
to a part of nature, namely the body of which it is the associated soul. 
The view that there is such a soul is most prominent in the Philosophical Letters and 
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. In early work, such as the Philosophical Fancies, there 
                                                
21 There are references throughout the Philosophical Letters, but see in particular PL 2.29-31. 
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seems to be no mention of a divine or supernatural soul. The mind, as it is discussed there, is 
material (Cavendish 1653, 93). The same view, indeed the same passage about the mind, 
appears in the first edition of the Philosophical and Physical Opinions (Cavendish 1655, 173). In 
“An epistle to the reader” of the second edition of the Opinions, however, Cavendish 
explicitly mentions a divine soul, only to say she won't talk about it: “I meddle not with the 
Particular Divine Souls of Men”. So by 1663 she seems to have been acknowledging that 
there was such a thing, which she would then discuss in the 1664 Letters and 1666 
Observations. However, as Eileen O’Neill notes in her edition of the Observations (Cavendish 
2001, 287) it appears that Cavendish argues against the divine soul view in the 1668 Grounds 
of Natural Philosophy (Cavendish 1668, 239). Thus the divine souls of humans appear and 
disappear from Cavendish's texts over time, and it looks indeed as if she changed her mind 
about this issue, albeit not for obvious reasons. 
Despite describing the divine soul in the Philosophical Letters, Cavendish is reluctant to 
say too much about it, as being outside the proper realm of natural philosophy. Thus she 
hopes to avoid the problems that others have because they mix up divine and natural souls.22 
Talking about More is a particularly apt place to discuss divine souls though, given his belief 
in an incorporeal spirit of nature – this is just the sort of mixing of souls that Cavendish 
decries. One of the few extended discussions of divine souls thus comes at the end of part 2 
of the Philosophical Letters.  
                                                
22 The main alleged problems are in natural philosophy. But there can be related problems 
on the religious side too: “I fear the opinion of Immaterial substances in Nature will at last 
bring in again the Heathen Religion, and make us believe a god Pan, Bacchus, Ceres, Venus, 
and the like, so as we may become worshippers of Groves and shadows, Beans and Onions, 
as our Forefathers” (PL 2.4). 
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One important question about divine souls is how an individual’s natural rational 
soul and their supernatural divine soul relate to one another. About that, Cavendish says the 
following: 
there may be supernatural spiritual beings or substances in Nature, without any 
hinderance to Matter or corporeal Nature. The same I may say of the natural 
material, and the divine and supernatural Soul; for though the divine Soul is in a 
natural body, and both their powers and actions be different, yet they cause no ruine 
or disturbance to each other, but do in many cases agree with each other, without 
incroachment upon each others powers or actions; for God, as he is the God of all 
things, so the God of Order. Wherefore it is not probable, that created Immaterial or 
Incorporeal beings should order Corporeal Nature, no more then Corporeal Nature 
orders Immaterial or Incorporeal Creatures (PL 2.31) 
One way to account for the relationship between the two souls would be to deny the causal 
efficacy of the divine soul in the natural world. But this is not what Cavendish does. Though 
the two do not disturb one another, this non-interference is a matter of “agreeing”, rather 
than of being unable to interfere with one another. That suggests that the divine soul could 
have effects in the natural world. Indeed, Cavendish says that the two souls “in many cases” 
agree, implying that they do not always do so.  
What happens when the two souls do not agree appears to be a mystery. Cavendish 
does allow for mysteries in this realm: the natural philosopher should not stray into the 
realm of the church, let alone mix the immaterial world into the natural one in her 
explanations. So perhaps this is a mystery in the system, not just a mystery of interpretation. 
 The divine soul, in any event, is a finite immaterial being. As such it may seem not to 
belong in Cavendish’s materialist system. But as she thought of the divine soul as a 
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supernatural, rather than a natural, being, she managed to maintain her materialism about the 
natural world, even during the period in which she asserted the existence of the divine soul. 
This materialism about the natural world, for all the curious form it took, was something to 
which Cavendish continued to have a strong attachment. 
 
4. Causal models 
I turn back, now, to my central topic of Cavendish’s anti-mechanist materialism. I focus in 
this section on issues related to causation.23 This allows me to explore some central aspects 
of Cavendish’s disagreement with other views, mechanist and materialist. 
Though it is difficult to give a full and accurate characterization of mechanism, one 
central mechanist idea is that many natural phenomena are to be explained as the results of 
mechanical interactions. The shapes, sizes, and motions of the small parts of things explain, 
the mechanists argued, more than one might otherwise think. The mechanism of a clock 
provided a useful example: its apparently non-mechanical ability to tell the time is explained 
by the shapes, sizes, and motions of the parts inside. The mechanist project was to explain 
more and more of nature in this sort of way. Descartes provides an obvious example of 
someone taking this sort of approach. Hobbes provides an even better one, for he thought 
that this sort of mechanical explanation applied to human cognition as well. 
That Hobbes and Descartes were wrong in this area is one of the themes of the first 
part of Cavendish’s Philosophical Letters. Here I want to draw attention to two aspects of this 
explicit rejection of mechanism. First, there is the rejection of particular proposed 
                                                
23 There is already considerable, helpful work on Cavendish on causation: see James (1999), 
O’Neill (2001), Detlefsen (2006; 2007), Michaelian (2009), and Cunning (2012). My main aim 
here is not to disagree with that, but to explore a different way of framing Cavendish’s 
project in this area. 
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explanations. Secondly, there is a broader rejection, connected to how Cavendish thinks 
about explanation and causation. 
One sort of disagreement, then, is with various particular explanatory claims. 
Cavendish’s discussion of Hobbes’s account of perception provides a useful example. 
Hobbes’s account of sense involves a pressure outside the perceiver, which then leads to a 
reaction on the inside. Thus, in the version of Leviathan: 
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ 
proper to each Sense, either immediately, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as 
in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of the Nerves, 
and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and 
Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to 
deliver it self: which endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. 
And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense (Leviathan 1.4).24 
Cavendish characterizes that as an account in terms of pressure and reaction. She responds 
by reversing the order of explanation: where Hobbes thought that pressure and reaction 
explained perception and thought, Cavendish thinks that perception and thought explain 
pressure and reaction. Thus she comments: “I will not say, that there is no pressure or 
reaction in Nature, but pressure and reaction doth not make perception, for the sensitive and 
rational parts of matter make all perception and variety of motion” (PL 1.18). 
That’s just one of many examples of Cavendish’s criticisms of particular explanatory 
claims. Others are more narrowly concerned with relatively internal problems in the views of 
Hobbes and Descartes. This one, however, also points towards the second aspect of 
                                                
24 I refer to Leviathan by chapter and paragraph number, using Malcolm’s edition (Hobbes 
2012). Hobbes tells similar stories, which appear to differ more in the argumentative context 
than in the underlying view, in chapter 2 of the Elements of Law (Hobbes 1994b) and chapter 
25 of De Corpore (Hobbes 1999). 
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Cavendish’s rejection of the mechanist approach. For Cavendish does not just disagree with 
Hobbes about which are the correct natural philosophical explanations. She also approaches 
the search for explanations in a different way, with a different basic model in mind. For the 
mechanist, the basic models are provided by examples like the workings of a clock, or 
perhaps the collisions of billiard balls, or even the motions of screws (as in Descartes’s 
explanation of magnetism). To explain other, seemingly quite different, phenomena, one 
looks for processes of these mechanical sorts, often in the small parts of the things involved. 
For Cavendish, in contrast, the human being provides the basic causal model. The 
basic model of a causal process is one in which someone perceives, considers, decides, and 
acts. Cavendish too, like the mechanist, needs to explain phenomena that do not obviously 
fit her basic causal model. But for her, they are the very cases that the mechanists take as 
basic. Thus the explanation of a collision between two billiard balls will fundamentally 
involve the second ball’s perceiving the first, deciding what to do in response, and moving 
off as a result. 
Thus when Cavendish talks in a general way about motion, she repeatedly talks about 
the knowledge in bodies, as well as the motion she thinks is in all of them. For example, in a 
discussion of More on the nature of matter: “Matter is self-moving, and very wise” (PL 
2.8).25 It’s not just that every body happens to be moving and thinking: there is an 
explanatory connection here. In addition, and strikingly, Cavendish explains phenomena in 
terms of the psychological states of bodies: “some of her Parts are pleased and delighted 
with other parts, but some of her parts are afraid or have an aversion to other parts; and 
hence is like and dislike, or sympathy and antipathy, hate and love” (PL 2.10).  
                                                
25 See also PL 1.30 on Descartes on motion. 
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These psychological processes in bodies are not all, perhaps, supposed to be exactly 
the same as those in human beings: one reads of things such as “mineral life and knowledge” 
and “vegetable knowledge” (PL 2.13). But the human is what we know. And the human 
agent is the model for thinking about everything else. 
For both Cavendish and her mechanist opponents, groups of commitments are 
bundled together. Explanations in natural philosophy, ontological commitments to what 
sorts of things there are in the natural world, and methodological commitments to sorts of 
explanations to look for, are all interconnected. Often one is not obviously prior to the 
others. But Cavendish’s rejection of mechanist views did not just involve a disagreement on 
the natural philosophical explanations, but also, I suggest, a disagreement on this issue of 
what one’s most basic models for understanding the world are.  
Cavendish’s use of this new model leads her to attribute many human features in 
surprising ways and places. Thus, in explaining the perception of sound, Cavendish 
considers some ways it can be inaccurate: 
if it be, that the motions are tyred with figuring ... then they move slowly and weakly, 
not that they are tyred and weak in strength, but with working and repeating one and 
the same object, and so through love to variety, change from working regularly to 
move irregularly, so as not to pattern outward objects as they ought (PL 1.22). 
Note this: “motions are tyred with figuring”. It’s not just a thinking thing that is the model 
here, but a human being who can become tired with things because they are repetitious, 
perhaps tediously so.26 
                                                
26 How exactly this is supposed to work when the inanimate matter is moved around by the 
animate, is a thing I find puzzling. It is as if the inanimate is a burden the animate carries 
around. So in that way one can use the terms of the model. But then the notion that 
everything is self-moving, and all causation internal, seems to disappear.  
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 Seeing this new model can also help us understand something that has seemed 
puzzling to readers of Cavendish: an apparent lack of explanation of central aspects of her 
views about causation. Thus O’Neill, after discussing Cavendish’s explanation of causal 
interactions in terms of perceptions, says that 
It may look as if Cavendish’s explanation in terms of the perceptions of the 
sympathetic parts of nature just pushes the initial question back a stage. Now we can 
ask: how does an occasional cause induce the primary cause to have the perceptions 
that it does, if there is no direct physical causation at work between the occasion and 
the primary cause? (O'Neill 2001, xxxiv).27 
The thought that there is a missing explanation depends, however, on thinking that 
perception and other psychological processes can’t be the most basic processes in the world. 
But if one wholeheartedly accepts Cavendish’s reversal of what is basic and what is 
derivative, there is just nothing more to be explained. The thoughts and actions of agents, 
such as humans, are the most basic things, not susceptible of further explanation.28 
In arguing that this change of causal model is at the heart of Cavendish’s view, I have 
focused on the psychological states of individuals. But there is another model at work in 
Cavendish’s texts, which might seem to be more important. This is the model of a society. 
Thus James (1999, 222) talks of Cavendish’s “[a]rguing from the polity to the natural world, 
as she frequently does”. Detlefsen (2006, 221-6) discusses Cavendish’s use of an analogy 
between the human body and the body politic, in a way that does not just involve thinking 
of a state or society on the model of a living body, but also “seems to take human society as 
                                                
27 See also the discussion of Michaelian (2009). 
28 One might still say that there is a lack of detail in Cavendish’s view here. Her explanations 
of this issue are not, perhaps, as thorough as, say, Leibniz’s explanations of the pre-
established harmony. (See Wilson (2007) on Cavendish and Leibniz.) But there is a question 
for which there is for Cavendish no possible answer. 
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the physically explanatory starting point, making the elements of the state – human beings as 
social beings – the explanatory model for the elements of the living body” (Detlefsen 2006, 
224). Indeed, Detlefsen says “Every finite individual being is analogous to a living body or a 
commonwealth in this way” (225). This emphasis on human societies as an explanatory 
model may seem to be in conflict with my emphasis on human individuals as an explanatory 
model. If there is any genuine conflict of interpretations here, it is quite minor, however. 
Clearly Cavendish does in various places compare a human individual to a society. But the 
society here is a society of thinking beings, themselves modeled on people. Thus even the 
parts of people are thought of as like people. Cavendish’s use of an analogy to society thus, if 
anything, further confirms the thought that she takes thinking agents as her basic causal 










                                                
29 [Acknowledgments removed for review.] 
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